Marquette Law Review
Volume 2
Issue 1 Volume 2, Issue 1 (1917)

Article 2

War Powers Under the Constitution
Charles E. Hughes

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Charles E. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, 2 Marq. L. Rev. 1 (1917).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol2/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

Larquettr iaw leuiw
Publishedquarterly during the School Year by the Marquette Law Students.
Subscription Price, $1.00 per year

35 cents per number

EDITORIAL BOARD
RUSSELL M. FRAWLEY, '18, Editor-in-Chief
ALBERT SCHNABEL, 'ig, Secretary and Treasurer

CHARLES F. WRATTEN, 'ig, Business Manager
MATT. F. BELEK, '2o, Circulation Manager
EDWARD H. CLEMENS, 'i8
E. C. SCHEIDHAUER, 'i8
GEORGE E. HASS, 'i8
CLARENCE BULLOCK,'ig
JOHN BURKE, 'i8
JOHN W. KELLEY, 'ig
HAROLD 4. DOYLE, 'i8
JOHN T. LINDSAY, '2o
CARL B. RIX, Faculty Adviser

EDITORIAL
The Marquette Law Review starts its second year as a legal
publication with a great deal more confidence than it did the
previous year. This is by reason of the hearty support it received
throughout the State, by the standard of the articles of its contributors, and the general interest taken by the bench and bar.
In this issue we are publishing the Honor Roll of the Law
School. If there are any doubts as to the lawyers' patriotism or
capabilities for a soldier, one glance will dispel these.
The Law Review has heard and heeded the call to the colors.
Most of the editorial staff is now in service while our business
manager is now Lieutenant Kelley in the U. S. Field Artillery,
and Mr. Lindsay, our circulation manager, is in the U. S. Radio
Corps. We miss them. We can't help but do so. But we also
know that Uncle Sam need never doubt them. For the same
personal sacrifice and effort which they rendered the Review will
be given to him in a thousandfold.
At the present time we hear much relative to the constitutional power to send troops to France, the constitutionality of
the Draft Act and the powers of the President under existing
circumstances. In fact, every emergency act in the eyes of the
pacifist, the milk and water patriot and the traitor within the
house, is an encroachment upon our fundamental rights. These
noble citizens forget that one of the purposes for the establishment
of the constitution was to "secure the blessings of Liberty to our-
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selves and our posterity". To secure these there must be drastic
action as the emergency presents itself. Can it be said that a
constitution, which has for one hundred and thirty years held together and guided a nation from thirteen insignificant states to
the mightiest power on the face of the globe, has failed to provide
for an emergency such as the present day? The thought repels
itself. Still there are some whose patriotism and loyalty cannot
be doubted, think that the constitution is being strained to its
limits. To these we answer in the words of Mr. Hughes that
the framers of our constitution made a "fighting constitution" and
the "power to wage war is the power to wage it successfully."
We are grateful to Mr. Hughes for the permission to publish
his address and are proud of the opportunity to be a means of
spreading this kind of doctrine.

THE LEGAL CLINIC
Much of late has been written regarding the legal clinic.
Recent articles have dealt with it from the viewpoint of the practicing attorney, the professor, and the student. The reasons for
this are obvious. In all probability there is no profession which
allowed the student to leave its classroom so unprepared to meet
the practical requirements of a successful practitioner as the law.
Not only was this a detriment to the young lawyer, but to the
practicing attorney and the client as well. A change. was needed
and demanded. The radical changes in the conditions and
methods of legal practice and professional office work have now
made the adequate provision for clinical training and experience
the most essential part of legal education.
This will be effectively supplied by association and co-operation between the Marquette College of Law and the Legal Aid
Society. Clinical service will be required as part of the fourth
year's work for a degree.
Marquette University College of Law will make earnest
clinical work through the Legal Aid Society a part of its curriculum for its full course and thus bring the law office with its
"direct atmosphere of daily professional life" to the law school
and the student. In learning in this way how to practice and how
to deal with clients as the principal object, the student learns the
technical practice and procedure as the machinery and the mere
incident of his work.

WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
By CHARLIES R. HUGHES, op NEw YORK.
Address delivered before the American Bar Association.
I.
In the unusual circumstances of war, it is natural that there
should be some confusion with respect to the constitutional warrant for extraordinary action taken or contemplated. Some altogether misconceive the constitution. Others vaguely fear that we
are serving temporary exigency at the expense of our fundamental law, and that we are thus breeding a lawless constitutionignoring spirit which is a serious menace to our future. Others
seek to raise doubts of power in order to embarrass the prosecution of the war. And there seem to be still others who in their
zeal impatiently and without thought put the constitution aside
as having no relation to these times.
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN WAR.
While we are at war, we are not in revolution. We are making war as a Nation organized under the constitution, from which
the established national authorities derive all their powers either
in war or in peace. The constitution is as effective today as it
ever was and the oath to support it is just as binding. But the
framers of the constitution did not contrive an imposing spectacle
of impotency. One of the objects of "a more perfect Union" was
"to provide for the common defence". A nation which could not
fight would be powerless to secure "the Blessings of Liberty to
Ourselves and our Posterity". Self-preservation is the first law
of national life and the constitution itself provides the necessary
powers in order to defend and preserve the United States. Otherwise, as Mr. Justice Story said, "the country would be in danger
of losing both its liberty and its sovereignty from its dread of
investing the public councils with the power of defending it. It
would be more willing to submit to foreign conquest than to
domestic rule."
DISTRIBUTION O POWERS.
The war powers under the constitution are carefully distributed. To Congress is given the power "to declare war". The
proposal to add "to make peace" found no favor, as this was
deemed to belong to the treaty-making power vested in the President and the Senate. To the President was given the direction of
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war as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. It was
not in the contemplation of the constitution that the command
of forces and the conduct of campaigns should be in charge of a
council or that as to this there should be division of authority or
responsibility. The prosecution of war demands in the highest
degree the promptness, directness and unity of action in military
operations which alone can proceed from the Executive. This
exclusive power to command the army and navy and thus to direct
and control campaigns exhibits not autocracy, but democracy
fighting effectively through its chosen instruments and in accordance with the established organic law.
PLENARY POWER TO WAGE WAR.
While the President is Commander-in-Chief, in the Congress
resides the authority "to raise and support Armies" and "to
provide and maintain a Navy"; and "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"; and as a
safeguard against military domination the power to raise and
support armies is qualified by the provision that "no appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer term than two
Years". Otherwise this power is unlimited. The Congress is to
prescribe the military organization and provide the military establishment, fix numbers, regulate equipment, afford maintenance,
and for these purposes appropriate such amounts of money as it
thinks necessary.
POWER TO PASS CONSCRIPTION LAWS.
Upon every citizen lies the duty of aiding in the common defence. In exercising its constitutional power to raise armies, the
Congress may enforce this duty. The Congress may call anyone
to service who is able to serve. The question who may be called,
or in what order, is simply one for the judgment of the National
Legislature. The power vested in Congress is not to raise armies
simply by calling for volunteers, but to raise armies by whatever
method Congress deems best, and hence must be deemed to embrace conscription. To the framers of the constitution, the draft
was a familiar mode of raising armies, as it had been resorted to
by the Colonies to fill up their quotas in the Revolutionary War.
It is true that the proposal, in 1814, of Monroe as Secretary of
War to resort to conscription was vigorously opposed as unconstitutional. But the draft was put in force both by the Union
and by the Confederacy during the Civil War and its validity was
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sustained by the courts in both North and South. 1 "The power
of coercing the citizen", said Judge Robertson, of Virginia, in
Burroughs v. Peyton, i6 Gratt. 47o (1864), "to render military
service, is indeed a transcendent power, in the hands of any government; but so far from being inconsistent with liberty, it is
essential to its preservation."
LINCOLN'S OPINION.
Permit me to quote upon this question the opinion prepared
(although not published) by President Lincoln, which sets forth
admirably the grounds for sustaining the power of Congress to
pass a Conscription Act.
"In this case, those who desire the rebellion to succeed,
and others who seek reward in a different way, are very
active in accommodating us with this class of arguments.
They tell us the law is unconstitutional. It is the first instance, I believe, in which the power of Congress to do a
thing has ever been questioned in a case when the power is
given by the Constitution in express terms. Whether a
power can be implied when it is not expressed has often
been the subject of controversy; but this is the first case in
which the degree of effrontery has been ventured upon of
denying a power which is plainly and distinctly written
down in the Constitution. The Constitution declares that
'The Congress shall have power . . . to raise and support

armies; but no appropriation of money to that' use shall be
.or a longer term than two years.' The whole scope of the
conscription act is 'to raise and support armies.' There is
nothing else in it.... Do you admit that the power is given
to raise and support armies, and yet insist that by this act
Congress has not exercised the power in a constitutional
mode? has not done the thing in the right way? Who is to
judge of this? The Constitution gives Congress the power,
but it does not prescribe the mode, or expressly declare who
shall prescribe it. In such case Congress must prescribe the
mode, or relinquish the power. There is no alternative.
• ..The power is given fully, completely, unconditionally.
It is not a power to raise armies if State authorities consent;
1 See Kneedler vs. Lane, 5 Phila. 485; 45 Pa. St. 238; McCall's Case,
Fed. Cas. No. 8669; Ex parte Hill, 38 Ala. 429; Ex parte Bolling, 39
Ala. 609; Jeffers vs. Fair,33 Ga. 347; Barber vs. Irwin, 34 Ga. 28; Parker
vs. Kaughman, 34 Ga. 136; Gatlin vs. Walton, 6o N. C. 333; Ex pane
Coupland, 26 Tex. 386; Burroughs vs. Peyton, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 47o;
also, Lanahan vs. Birge, 30 Conn. 438, 443; Matter of Spangler, ii Mich.
298; Allen vs. Colby, 47 N. H. 544; In re Griner, 16 Wis. 423; Druecker vs.
Salonzon, 21 Wis. 621.
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nor if the men to compose the armies are entirely willing;
but it is a power to raise and support armies given to Congress by the Constitution without an 'if.' . . . The principle
of the draft, which simply is involuntary or enforced service,
is not new. It has been practiced in all ages of the world.
It was well known to the framers of our Constitution as one
of the modes of raising armies, at the time they placed in
that instrument the provision that 'the Congress shall have
power to raise and support armies.' . . . Wherein is the
peculiar hardship now? Shall we shrink from the necessary
means to maintain our free government, which our grandfathers employed to establish it and our own fathers have
already employed once to maintain it? Are we degenerate?
Has the manhood of the race run out ?" 2
These are the words of Lincoln, penned in the midst of the
Civil War, in which conscription was enforced, and his reasoning
is conclusive. And while the question was not presented to the
United States Supreme Court, the power of Congress was ex4
plicitly recognized in Tarble's case 3 and in later opinions.
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS.
The constitutional authority thus vested in Congress is not
limited by any qualification arising from religious beliefs or conscientious objections. These are matters not affecting power, but
policy. As Mr. Justice Harlan said in delivering the opinion of
the Supreme Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,5 one "may be
compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard
to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his
religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of
the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down
in its defence". It is, however, in my judgment, a sound policy
on the part of Congress to provide for the discharge from the
draft of conscientious objectors. Nothing, I believe, is gained
for the country by over-riding the claims of conscience in such
cases; but it is obviously necessary that there should be such definitions and restrictions as will prevent imposture and evasion by
those who have as little conscience as they have stomach for war.
2 Lincoln's Works, Vol. II, p. 388.
3 13 Wall. 397, 408.
4 See In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, 153; Jacobson vs. Massachusetts,
197 U. S. ii, 29.
5 197 U. S., p. 29.
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THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT.
It is now contended in some quarters that this power, which
undoubtedly Congress had, has been restricted or abolished by
the Thirteenth Amendment, which was adopted after the close
of the Civil War. This amendment provides that "Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction." It has been said by the United States Supreme Court
that the plain intention "was to abolish slavery of whatever name
and form and all its badges and incidents; to render impossible
any state of bondage; to make labor free by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or
coerced for another's benefit, which is the essence of involuntary
servitude." It hits not only slavery, but peonage. But the
language of the amendment was not new. It reproduced the historic words of the Ordinance of 1787 for the Government of the
Northwest Territory, and its terms, construed in the light of its
history and plain purpose, afford no basis whatever for the conclusion that it interfered in the slightest degree with the power
of Congress to raise and support armies.
In the case of Robertson v. BaldwUin,6 it was argued that the
Thirteenth Amendment invalidated certain provisions of the
Revised Statutes authorizing justices of the peace to issue warrants for deserting seamen. In denying the claim, the Court said:
"It is clear, however, that the amendment was not intended to
introduce any novel doctrine with respect to certain descriptions
of service which have always been treated as exceptions, such as
military and naval enlistments." The soldier drafted under Act
of Congress is performing the duty which he owes of aiding in the
common defence, and the constitutional amendment contemplates
no escape from the duty to defend and preserve the United States.
POWER OVER THE MILITIA.
The power to "raise and support armies" should not be confused with the power given to Congress "to provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions"; and "to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
6 165 U. S. 275.
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States, reserving to the States respectively the Appointment of
the Officers and the Authority of training the Militia according
to the discipline prescribed by Congress." The President is Commander-in-Chief not only of "the Army and Navy of the United
States",. but also "of the Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States".
The militia, within the meaning of these provisions of the
constitution, is distinct from the army of the United States. "Remember always", said Daniel Webster, "that the great principle
of the Constitution on that subject is that the militia is the militia
of the states, and not of the general government; and being thus
the militia of the states, there is no part of the Constitution
worded with greater care, and with a more scrupulous jealousy,
than that which grants and limits the power of Congress over it."
In order to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection and to repel invasions, it would be necessary either to
employ regular troops or to employ the militia. And the power
given to Congress with respect to the militia was manifestly to
make a large standing army unnecessary. But as the service of
the organized militia can only be required by the National Government for the limited purposes specified in the constitution, it
follows (as Attorney-General Wickersham advised President
TaftT) that the organized militia, as such, cannot be employed
for offensive warfare outside the limits of the United States.
MAY SEND ARMY ABROAD.
This, however, is apart from the power of Congress to raise
and support a federal army. Congress may be content with a
small standing army in ordinary times, but Congress may create
and equip such army as it pleases, subject to the qualification with
respect to appropriations. It can equip an army in preparation
for war, and of course it may furnish whatever army is required
for the prosecution of war. The organization and service of an
army raised by Congress are not subject to the limitations governing its control of the militia. The power to use an army is
co-extensive with the power to make war; and the army may be
used wherever the war is carried on, here or elsewhere. There
is no limitation upon the authority of Congress to create an army
and it is for the President as Commander-in-Chief to direct the
campaigns of that army wherever he may think they should be
729

ops. Attorney-General, 322; see Martin vs. Mott, 12 Wheat. i9.
8
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carried on. As Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the Supreme
Court in Fleming v. Page,S said: "As Commander-in-Chief, he
is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military
forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the
manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and
subdue the enemy. He may invade the hostile country, and subject it to the sovereignty and authority of the United States."
We employed our arms in Canada in the War of 1812; our
troops were again sent to foreign soil in the Mexican War and
in the war with Spain, and more recently have been employed in
China and Mexico. There is no doubt of the constitutional
authority to employ our forces on the battlefields of Europe in
the war that we are now waging for the safety of the United
States and to conquer an enduring peace that the liberties of free
peoples throughout the world may forever be secured from the
aggressions of unscrupulous military power.
POWER TO WAGE WAR SUCCESSFULLY.
The power to wage war is the power to wage war successfully. The framers of the constitution were under no illusions
as to war. They had emerged from a long struggle which had
taught them the weakness of a mere confederation, and they had
no hope that they could hold what they had won save as they established a Union which could fight with the strength of one
people under one government entrusted with the common defence. In equipping the National Government with the needed
authority in war, they tolerated no limitations inconsistent with
that object, as they realized that the very existence of the Nation
might be at stake and that every resource of the people must be at
command. Said Madison in the Federalist: "Security against
foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It
is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The
powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to
the federal councils." 9 And Hamilton said: "The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing for
the national defence, is one of those refinements which owe their
origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened." 10 ie
again emphasizes the same idea in these words: "The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for
89 How., 6o3, 615.
9Federalist, No. XLI.

10

Id., No. XXVI.
9
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this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on
the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought
to be co-extensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same
councils which are appointed to preside over the common defence." 11

It was in this view that plenary power was given to Congress
to wage war and to raise armies. It is also in the light of this
conception of national exigencies that we must read subdivision
18 of Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution (following the
enumeration of powers), which gives Congress the authority "to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Office thereof". It must also be
remembered that it is of the essence of national power that where
it exists it dominates. There is no room in our scheme of government for the assertion of state power in hostility to the authorized exercise of federal power. The power of the National
Government to carry on war is explicit and supreme, and the
authority thus resides in Congress to make all laws which are
needed for that purpose; that is, to Congress in the event of war
is confided the power to enact whatever legislation is necessary
to prosecute the war with vigor and success, and this power is to
be exercised without impairment of the authority committed to
the President as Commander-in-Chief to direct military operations.
POWER OF THE PRESIDENT.
Each of these powers, that of Congress and of the President,
is the subject of a distinct grant, each is the complement of the
other, and together they furnish the adequate equipment of
authority for war. There is no more impressive spectacle than
that of the President of the Republic in time of war when in addition to the other great powers of his office he acts in supreme
command of the armed forces of the Nation and conducts its
military campaigns. It was under this power that President
Lincoln defended the Proclamation of Emancipation. It related
to those held as slaves in the States in rebellion, and he regarded
it, as it recited, as a necessary act of war within his authority as
2 Id., No. XXIII.
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Commander-in-Chief. He thus expressed this point of view:
"You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I think
the Constitution invests its Commander-in-Chief with the law of
war in time of war. The most that can be said - if so much - is
that slaves are property. Is there - has there ever been - any
question that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and
friends, may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it helps us, or hurts the enemy? Armies, the world
over, destroy enemies' property when they cannot use it; and even
destroy their own to keep it from the enemy." 12
It is also to be observed that the power exercised by the
President in time of war is greatly augmented, outside of his
functions as Commander-in-Chief, through legislation of Congress increasing his administrative authority. War demands the
highest degree of efficient organization, and Congress in the nature of things cannot prescribe many important details as it legislates for the purpose of meeting the exigencies of war. Never is
adaptation of legislation to practical ends so urgently required.
and hence Congress naturally in very large measure confers upon
the President the authority to ascertain and determine various
states of fact to which legislative measures are addressed.
Further, a wide range of provisions relating to the organization
and government of the army and navy which Congress might
enact if it saw fit, it authorizes the President to prescribe. The
principles governing the delegation of legislative power are clear,
and while they are of the utmost importance when properly
applied, they are not such as to make the appropriate exercise
of legislative power impracticable. "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate
a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the
law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny
this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many
things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which
cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore,
be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of
legislation."' 13 Congress cannot be permitted to abandon to
others its proper legislative functions; but in time of war when
legislation must be adapted to many situations of the utmost complexity, which must be dealt with effectively and promptly, there
12 Lincoln's Works, Vol. II, p. 397.
's See Field vs. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694.
11
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is special need for flexibility and for every resource of practicality;
and, of course, whether the limits of permissible delegation are
in any case over-stepped always remains a judicial question. We
thus not only find these great war powers conferred upon the
Congress and the President, respectively, but also a vast increase
of administrative authority through legislative action springing
from the necessities of war.
OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONTAXING POWER.
The question remains: What may be deemed to be the force
and effect in time of war of the restrictive provisions contained in
the constitution with respect to the exercise of federal authority?
It is manifest, at once, that the great organs of the National Government retain and perform their functions as the constitution
prescribes. Senators and Representatives are qualified and chosen
as provided in the constitution and the legislative power vested
in the Congress must be exercised in the required manner. The
President is still the constitutional Executive, elected in the manner provided and subject to the restraints imposed upon his office.
The judicial power of the United States continues to be vested
in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress has
ordained. Again, apart from the provisions fixing the framework of the Government, there are limitations which by reason
of their express terms or by necessary implication must be regarded as applicable as well in war as in peace. Thus -one of the
expressed objects of the power granted to Congress "to lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises" is to "provide for
the common defence," and it cannot be doubted that taxes laid
for this purpose, that is, to support the army and navy and to
provide the means for military operations, must be laid subject to
the constitutional restrictions. That is, all duties, imposts and
excises must be uniform throughout the United States, and direct
taxes must be apportioned among the States according to population. And by the Sixteenth Amendment providing that income
taxes, from whatever source derived, may be laid without apportionment among the States, these taxes fall into the great class of
excise, duties and imposts and are alike subject to the rule requiring geographical uniformity, a requirement operative in war as
well as in peace.
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TREASON.
The provisions as to treason are also clearly applicable in
war: "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying War against them, or, in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort"; and "The Congress shall have power
to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during
the Life of the Person attainted."
FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS.
But what shall be said of the efficacy in time of war of the
great guarantees of personal and property rights? It would be
impossible on this occasion to discuss comprehensively this important subject, or even to refer to all these guarantees, but we
may briefly touch upon the question in its relation to the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments, viz.:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service
in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence."
Clearly, these amendments, normally and perfectly adapted
to conditions of peace, do not have the same complete and universal application in time of war. Thus the Fifth Amendment normally gives its protection to "any person". But, in war, this must
yield to the undoubted national power to capture and confiscate
the property of enemies. This was distinctly ruled by the Supreme Court in Miller vs. United States,1 4 a proceeding brought
under the Confiscation Acts of 186i and 1862 to confiscate shares
14 ii

Wall.

268, 304-3o5.
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of stock owned by Miller, a Virginian, in a Michigan corporation. The court said:
"if the act of 1861, and the fifth, sixth, and seventh sections
of the act of July 17, 1862, were municipal regulations only,
there would he force in the objection that Congress has disregarded the restrictions of the fifth and sixth amendments
of the Constitution ....
if, on the contrary, they are an exercise of the war powers of the government, it is clear that
they are not affected by the restrictions imposed by the fifth
and sixth amendments. This we understand to have been
conceded in the argument. The question, therefore, is,
whether the action of Congress was a legitimate exercise of
the war power. The Constitution confers upon Congress
expressly'power to declare war, grant letters of marque and
reprisal, and make rules respecting captures on land and
water. Upon the exercise of these powers no restrictions
are imposed. Of course the power to declare war involves
the power to prosecute it by all means and in any manner
in which war may be legitimately prosecuted. It therefore
includes the right to seize and confiscate all property of an
enemy and to dispose of it at the will of the captor. This
is and always has been an undoubted belligerent right."
MARTIAL LAW.
Again, in the place where actual military operations are being conducted, the ordinary rights of citizens must yield to paramount military necessity. This was conceded in Millgan's case,1 5
where it was said in the prevailing opinion:
"If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the -courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theatre of actual military
operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to
furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown,
to preserve the safety- of the army and society; and as no
power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by
martial rule until the laws can have their free course."
A different question, however, is presented with respect to
the rights of citizens, and others not enemies, in places which are
outside the actual theatre of war. It was upon the question of
the power of Congress to provide for the trial of citizens by
military commission in such places that the justices sharply divided in the noted case of Milligan.16 He was a citizen of
Indiana, who had been tried by a military commission at Indianapolis on a charge of aiding the enemy and conspiring against
154 Wall. 2, 127.

104 Wall. 2.

WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

the Government, and had been sentenced to be hung. He was
not a resident of one of the rebellious States, nor a prisoner of
war, and he had not been in the military or naval service. The
court was unanimous in the opinion that under the terms of the
Act of Congress creating the commission it had no jurisdiction.
But the majority of the Court went further and declared that
Congress was without power to provide for the trial of citizens
by military commissions save in the locality of actual war and
when there was no access to the courts. Maintaining with eloquent emphasis the guarantees of freedom contained in the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments, the majority of the Court asserted that
"Martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.
Martial
M..
rule can never exist where the courts are open, and
in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It
is also confined to the locality of actual war."
The minority of four Justices, led by Chief Justice Chase,
while agreeing that there was no jurisdiction in Milligan's case
under the Act of Congress, strongly insisted that Congress in
time of war had the power to provide for the punishment of
citizens, charged with conspiracy against the United States, by
military tribunals, if it was deemed necessary for the public
safety. Deducing this view from the war powers conferred by
the constitution, the Chief Justice said:
"Where peace exists the laws of peace must prevail.
What we do maintain is, that when the nation is involved in
war, and some portions of the country are invaded, and all
are exposed to invasion, it is within the power of Congress
to determine to what states or districts such great and imwinent public danger exists as justifies the authorization of
military tribunals for the trial of crimes and offenses against
the discipline or security of the army or against the public
safety.... The fact that the federal courts were open was regarded by Congress as a sufficient reason for not exercising
the power; but that fact could not deprive Congress of the
right to exercise it. Those courts might be open and undisturbed in the execution of their functions, and yet wholly
incompetent to avoid threatened danger, or to punish, with
adequate promptitude and certainty the guilty conspirators.
.I. In times of rebellion and civil war it may often happen,
indeed, that judges and marshals will be in active sympathy
with the rebels, and courts their most efficient allies ....

It

was for Congress to determine the question of expediency."
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Professor Willoughby, in a careful review of the Milligan
case,17 regards the doctrine of the majority as essentially sound,
that the necessity justifying martial law may not be created by
legislative fiat. But he suggests that the majority went too far
in the absolute declaration that martial law cannot arise from "a
threatened invasion," and that the mere fact that the courts are
open, regardless of all other conditions, is a conclusive test. "The
better doctrine," says Willoughby, "is not for the courts to attempt to determine in advance with respect to any one element
what does, what does not, create a necessity for martial law, but,
as in all other cases of the exercise of official authority, to test
the legality of an act by its special circumstances."
Certainly, the test should not be a mere physical one, nor
should substance be sacrificed to form. The majority recognized
"a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority," when
overthrown, in order "to preserve the safety of the army and
society." If this necessity actually exists it cannot be doubted
that the power of the Nation is adequate to meet it, but the rights
of the citizen may not be impaired by an arbitrary legislative
declaration. Outside the actual theatre of war, and if, in a true
sense, the administration of justice remains unobstructed, the
right of the citizen to normal judicial procedure is secure.
CITIZEN'S RIGHTS OF PROPERTY.
Further, with respect to the citizen's rights of -property, a
distinction may be taken between the unavoidable deprivations
which take place where the conflict rages, and those takings, although for military purposes, which are deliberate appropriations
for which compensation must be made. As was said by the
Supreme Court in United States vs. Russell:'8
"Private property, the Constitution provides, shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation ....

Ex-

traordinary and unforeseen occasions arise, however, beyond
all doubt, in cases of extreme necessity in time of war or of
immediate and impending public danger, in which private
property may be impressed into the public service, or may be
seized or appropriated to the public use, or may even be destroyed without the consent of the owner. .-. . Where such

an extraordinary and unforeseen emergency occurs in the
public service in time of war no doubt is entertained that the
power of the government is ample to supply for the moment
172 Willoughby on the
'8

13 Wall. 623, 627-628.
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the public wants in that way to the extent of the immediate
public exigency, but the public danger must be immediate,
imminent, and impending, and the emergency in the public
service must be extreme and imperative, and such as will
not admit of delay or a resort to any other source of supply... Such a justification may be shown, and when shown
the rule is well settled that the officer taking private property for such a purpose, if the emergency is fully proved, is
not a trespasser, and that the government is bound to make
full compensation to the owner."
REASONABLE REGULATIONS TO INSURE
SUCCESS IN WAR.
Distinct from such requisitions from individuals is the necessary regulation of the use of property to secure the successful
prosecution of the war. We are witnessing a new phase of the
exercise of war powers. But the applicable principle to determine the validity of such action is not new. Even in times of
peace we are familiar with the principle of regulation which extends to callings "affected with a public interest". The Supreme
Court, after reviewing the decisions, recently said:
"They demonstrate that a business, by circumstances
and its nature, may rise from private to be a public concern
and be subject, in consequence, to governmental regulation.
And they demonstrate ...

that the attempts made to place

the right of public regulation in the cases in which it has
been exerted, and of which we have given examples, upon
the ground of special privilege conferred by the public on
those affected cannot be supported. 'The underlying principle is that business of certain kinds holds such a peculiar
relation to the public interests that there is superinduced
upon it the right of public regulation.'" 19
The extraordinary circumstances of war may bring particular business and enterprises clearly into the category of those
which are affected with a public interest and which demand immediate and thorough-going public regulation. The production
and distribution of foodstuffs, articles of prime necessity, those
which have direct relation to military efficiency, those which are
absolutely required for the support of the people during the stress
of conflict, are plainly of this sort. Reasonable regulations to
safeguard the resources upon which we depend for military success must be regarded as being within the powers confided to
Congress to enable it to prosecute a successful war.
19 German Alliance Insurance Co. vs. Kansas, 233 U. S., 389, 41L
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In the words of the Supreme Court: "It is also settled beyond dispute that the Constitution is not self-destructive. In
other words, that the power which it confers on the one hand it
does not immediately take away on the other... "20
This was
said in relation to the taxing power. Having been granted in
express terms, the Court held it had not been taken away by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. As the Supreme
Court put it in another case: "the Constitution does not conflict
with itself by conferring upon the one hand a taxing power and
taking the same power away on the other by the limitations of the
due process clause." 21
Similarly, it may be said that the power has been expressly
given to Congress to prosecute war, and to pass all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying that power into execution. That power explicitly conferred and absolutely essential
to the safety of the Nation is not destroyed or impaired by any
later provision of the constitution or by any one of the amendments. These may all be construed so as to avoid making the
constitution self-destructive, so as to preserve the rights of the
citizens from unwarrantable attack, while assuring beyond all
hazard the common defence and the perpetuity of our liberties.
These rest upon the preservation of the nation.
It has been .said that the constitution marches. That is, there
are constantly new applications of unchanged powers, and it is
ascertained that in novel and complex situations, the old grants
contain, in their general words and true significance, needed and
adequate authority. So, also, we have a fighting constitution.
We cannot at this time fail to appreciate the wisdom of the
fathers, as under this charter, one hundred and thirty years old the constitution of Washington- the people of the United States
fight with the power of unity,- as we fight for the freedom of
our children and that hereafter the sword of autocrats may never
threaten the world.
20

Billings vs. United States, 232 U. S., 261, 282.
- Brushabervs. United States, 240 U. S. I, 24.

